A prospective study of patient safety incidents in gastrointestinal endoscopy by Matharoo, Manmeet et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1055/s-0042-117219
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Matharoo, M., Haycock, A., Sevdalis, N., & Thomas-Gibson, S. (2017). A prospective study of patient safety
incidents in gastrointestinal endoscopy. Endoscopy international open, 5(1), E83-E89. DOI: 10.1055/s-0042-
117219
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
Introduction
A plethora of evidence supports the premise that the incidence
of iatrogenic harm is significant [1, 2]. Adverse events (AEs) are
defined as unintended injuries or complications caused by
medical management as opposed to the disease process itself
[3]. In 1999 the Institute of Medicine’s report, “To err is Hu-
man” [4] stated that medical error accounts for up to 98,000
deaths, superseding mortality from breast cancer. In the UK,
Vincent et al.’s retrospective record review of 1014 patients re-
vealed that AEs occurred in 10.8% of hospital admissions, with
half deemed to be preventable and one-third leading to moder-
ate disability or death [5]. Furthermore, it was estimated that
preventable AEs could save the NHS £1 billion a year in extra
bed days alone, aside from the personal, social, and wider eco-
nomic implications.
Retrospective analyzes of cases where patients have been
harmed favor a “systems approach: to safe care delivery, rather
than a focus on individual physicians [6]. The systems approach
suggests that AEs often arise from multiple failures across an
entire patient pathway [7], where minor errors can accumulate
and lead to a major patient safety incident (e. g. performing a
procedure on the wrong patient). Never events are serious pre-
ventable incidents that further highlight the importance of pre-
vention of error. [8] Furthermore, there is growing awareness
that human factors are heavily implicated in medical error.
This has been well established in drug errors [9], intensive care
[10] anesthetics [11] and surgery [12] but is yet to be defined in
endoscopy.
AEs in endoscopy are well recognized [13] but the primary
focus remains on technical procedural outcomes. Reported
AEs therefore tend to be procedure-specific [14] and represent
the severe (but rare) end of the spectrum as opposed to minor
(but more frequent) events. The 2004 National Confidential En-
quiry into Patient Outcomes and Death (NCEPOD) following
gastrointestinal endoscopy sought to further understand pa-
tient safety issues in cases of fatalities within 30 days of an
endoscopic examination [15]. This high-profile report recom-
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ABSTRACT
Background and study aims Medical error occurs frequently with
significant morbidity and mortality. This study aime to assess the
frequency and type of endoscopy patient safety incidents (PSIs).
Patients and methods A prospective observational study of PSIs in
routine diagnostic and therapeutic endoscopy was undertaken in a
secondary and tertiary care center. Observations were undertaken
within the endoscopy suite across pre-procedure, intra-procedure
and post-procedure phases of care. Experienced (Consultant-level)
and trainee endoscopists from medical, surgical, and nursing speci-
alities were included. PSIs were defined as any safety issue that had
the potential to or directly adversely affected patient care: PSIs in-
cluded near misses, complications, adverse events and “never
events”. PSIs were reviewed by an expert panel and categorized for
severity and nature via expert consensus.
Results One hundred and forty procedures (92 diagnostic, 48 ther-
apeutic) over 37 lists (experienced operators n =25, trainees n =12)
were analyzed. One hundred forty PSIs were identified (median 1
per procedure, range 0–7). Eighty-six PSIs (61%) occurred in 48
therapeutic procedures. Zero PSIs were detected in 13 diagnostic
procedures. 21 (15%) PSIs were categorized as severe and 12 (9%)
had the potential to be “never events,” including patient misidenti-
fication and wrong procedure. Forty PSIs (28%) were of intermedi-
ate severity and 78 (56%) were minor. Oxygen monitoring PSIs oc-
curred most frequently.
Conclusion This is the first study documenting the range and fre-
quency of PSIs in endoscopy. Although many errors are minor with-
out immediate consequence, further work should identify whether
prevention of such recurrent errors affects the incidence of severe
errors, thus improving safety and quality.
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mended improvements in appropriate patient selection, pre-
procedural optimization of the patient and safe sedation and
monitoring amongst others. In parallel, Bowles et al. [16] raised
important concerns about colonoscopy in the UK. Significant
quality issues were identified regarding cecal intubation rates,
sedation safety and endoscopy training provision. In the United
States analyses of malpractice claims also highlight suboptimal
performance and diagnostic error linked with missed cancer at
colonoscopy as a significant issues [17]. Optimal complication
management may improve patient satisfaction and outcome
and may serve to minimize litigation [18]. Taken together,
these studies raise key considerations for patient safety in
endoscopy.
In recent years, there have been significant improvements in
endoscopy [19] in the UK driven in part by the National Bowel
Cancer Screening program [20] necessitating consistent high-
quality practice. Additionally, the “Global Rating Scale” [21],
an online assessment tool, has focused UK endoscopy to pro-
vide high-quality patient-centered care. Whilst this biannual
census provides incentive to improve services, it does not cap-
ture and address day-to-day patient safety issues. There is ac-
knowledgement from the profession that broader recognition
and documentation of endoscopic AEs is important: The Amer-
ican Society of Gastrointestinal Endoscopy (ASGE) developed a
detailed lexicon for considering AEs in endoscopy [22], al-
though there are practical challenges to reliably using this in
practice. Nevertheless, such measures represent a shift toward
accurate, transparent AE data that not only clarify the scale of
the problem but can also facilitate an understanding of the
etiology of error in endoscopy.
It is within this context of safety and quality in healthcare
that endoscopy practice should be scrutinized. Furthermore,
with the expansion in bowel cancer screening programs, in-
creasing numbers of asymptomatic individuals will undergo an
endoscopic procedure. Advances in endoscopic techniques en-
able more complex therapy in potentially older patients with
more comorbidities, with all the inherent risks. To further im-
prove quality and safety in endoscopy, a structured analysis of
current safety issues is required.
Patients and methods
This was a prospective observational study of patient safety in-
cidents in a single secondary/tertiary endoscopy referral center
in the UK. Ethical approval for the study was obtained (NRES
Committee London, Reference 08/H0719/54) and informed
consent to observe each procedure was obtained from the pa-
tient and the endoscopist. Patients undergoing lower and up-
per gastrointestinal endoscopic examinations were included
and cases were both diagnostic and therapeutic. Endoscopists
performing the procedures were trainees and consultants and
included medical gastroenterologists, colorectal surgeons and
independent endoscopy nurse practitioners1.
Patient safety incidents (PSIs) were defined as any event dur-
ing a procedure that had the potential to, or directly adversely
affected patient care: PSIs with and without immediate conse-
quences were included. Specifically, PSIs were defined [23] as
near misses2, recognized procedural complications3, AEs4 and
“never events” according to the UK Department of Health’s
classification at the time of the study [24]. “Never events” are
a subset of serious incidents (e. g. patient misidentification)
that are wholly preventable if established national guidance is
implemented [8].
PSIs were recorded on a structured proforma by a gastroen-
terologist trained in skills and safety observational technique
while the patient was in the endoscopy unit across pre-proce-
dure, intra-procedure and post-procedure phases of care. Pro-
Medical n = 26
70 %
Surgical n = 6
16 %
Nursing n = 5
14 %
▶ Fig. 1 Endoscopy lists by specialty.
Specialist 
Endoscopist 
(MC)
Key
C: Consultant
T: Trainee
M: Medical
S: Surgical
NE: Nurse endoscopist
GI: Gastrointestinal
CR: Colorectal
GI (MC) GI (MT) CR (SC) CR (ST) NE
4
3
7
1
5
2
▶ Fig. 2 Endoscopist specialty and expertise.
1 Endoscopy nurse practitioners are trained, assessed and monitor their Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the same manner as medical and surgical
endoscopists in the UK through the Joint Advisory Group (JAG) for Endos-
copy.
2 Near Miss: Any event that could have had an adverse patient consequence
but did not and was indistinguishable from a complete full-blown AE in all
but outcome.
3 Complication: Adapted from Clavien Dindo Classification for Surgery: De-
fined as any significant deviation from the normal postoperative course
that may or may not require intervention.
4 Adverse Event: Unintended patient injury caused by medical management
(rather than the underlying disease) resulting in measurable disability, pro-
longed hospitalisation or both.
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cedures were observed from within the endoscopy room in real
time. To cross-validate the accuracy of the observational data,
the medical record, nursing notes and endoscopy reports were
also examined for recorded evidence of any PSIs. This metho-
dology has been shown to enhance sensitivity of PSI detection
[25] and was based on similar methods undertaken in surgery
[26]. All recorded PSIs were subsequently submitted to an ex-
pert panel for review and consensus-based categorization of
their nature and severity. The panel consisted of 2 expert
endoscopists (STG and AH) and a patient safety expert (NS).
The panel rated each PSI according to severity: minor, inter-
mediate and severe defined by the actual or potential impact
to the patient and adherence to established best practice.
Results
One hundred forty procedures, 92 diagnostic and 48 therapeu-
tic, were analyzed in a 4-month period in 2011 over 37 endos-
copy lists by experienced (n =25) and trainee operators (n =12).
These endoscopy lists or sessions were conducted by 22 differ-
ent endoscopists of medical, surgical and nursing backgrounds
(▶Fig. 1 and ▶Fig. 2). Therapeutic procedures consisted of po-
lypectomy, endoscopic mucosal resection (EMR), endoscopic
submucosal dissection (ESD), esophageal variceal ligation,
common bile duct (CBD) stone clearance and biliary stent inser-
tion during endoscopic retrograde cholangiography (ERCP).
A total of 140 PSIs were identified (median 1 per procedure,
range 0–7). Fifty-four (39%) PSIs were recorded within the di-
agnostic cases and 86 (61%) within the therapeutic cases. All
therapeutic cases had at least 1 PSI. Five out of the 31 lists ob-
served had 0 PSIs, which comprised 13 diagnostic procedures in
total. Four out of 5 of these lists were performed by endos-
copists who were consultants and the fifth was a senior endos-
copy trainee.
Of the 140 PSIs, 21 (15%) PSIs were rated as severe and 12
(9%) had the potential to be “never events.” Forty (28%) PSIs
were rated as intermediate and 78 (56%) as minor (▶Fig. 3).
One PSI was an anticipated procedural complication (post-po-
lypectomy hemorrhage) requiring a repeat colonoscopy under
general anesthetic with a successful clinical outcome and was
not classified within this system.
PSIs fell into 1 of 9 major categories:
1. Oxygen monitoring
2. Distractors and time management
3. Non-technical skills5 [27] and training
4. Documentation and reporting errors
5. Technical skills and equipment
6. Sedation, intravenous (IV) access and monitoring
7. Drug errors
8. Consent
9. Histology and sampling errors.
The frequency and severity of PSIs within these categories is
summarized in ▶Fig. 4. ▶Table 1 illustrates the severe PSIs ob-
served and those that could constitute a never event. We found
that severe PSIs were associated with other minor PSIs within
the patient pathway, in a manner consistent with the systems
view of iatrogenic errors (▶Fig. 5).
Examples of intermediate PSIs included a sedated patient on
a trolley with the side rails down, excess sedation6 in an elderly
patient with no reversal agent administered, and omission of
administered IV sedatives in endoscopy report documentation.
Intermediate n = 40
28 %
Severe n = 21
15 %
Minor n = 78
56 %
Accepted 
complication n = 1 
1 %
▶ Fig. 3 Patient safety Incidents categorized by severity.
Oxygen monitoring n = 32
Distractors/Time Management n = 24
Non-technical skills/Training n = 19
Documentation/Reporting Errors n = 17
Technical skills/Equipment n = 16
Sedation/IV Access/Monitoring n = 12
Drug Errors n = 7
Consent n = 7
Histology Sampling Errors n = 5
Mild Intermediate Severe
11
10 72
12 23
7 32
2 14
5
5
2
7 9
24
13 8
▶ Fig. 4 Patient safety incident categorization by theme and sever-
ity.
5 Non-Technical Skills are defined as the cognitive, social and personal re-
source skills that complement technical skills and contribute to safe and ef-
ficient task performance. These have been defined for endoscopy and in-
clude communication and teamwork, situation awareness, judgement and
decision-making and leadership skills.
6 Defined according to BSG guidance of maintaining verbal contact with se-
dated patient throughout the period of conscious sedation. http://www.
bsg.org.uk/clinical-guidelines/endoscopy/guidelines-on-safety-and-seda-
tion-during-endoscopic-procedures.html
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1. Resource/Time 
constraints
Overbooked list starts 
late as nursing staff 
unavailable
LOSSES
HAZARDS
2. Poor communication
Nurse calls Mrs. Sharp 
in waiting area (in toilet). 
Mrs. Clarke (elderly and 
hard of hearing) stands 
up.
▪ Patient 
 Misidentification
▪ Wrong Site 
 Procedure
Endoscopist realised 
Flexible Sigmoidoscopy 
was requested instead of 
Colonoscopy due to ‘poor 
bowel preparation’ and 
patient stating she had not 
had bowel preparation. 
Procedure terminated & 
medical record amended.
3. Safety Policy
Inadequate patient 
identification check & 
wrong notes in room
4. Teamwork Failures
Endoscopist & nurses in 
room distracted & 
safety checks omitted 
5. Individual Error
Endoscopist fails to 
review patient and 
procedure indication
6. Drug Error
Patient given IV 
sedation and Buscopan 
for presumed 
colonoscopy. Drugs 
omitted from report.
▶ Fig. 5 Swiss cheese model illustrating the coalition of minor errors leading to significant patient safety incidents in 1 observed case.
▶Table 1 Severe PSIs observed.
PSI Detail Severity of
PSI*
Never Event
Y/N
Frequency
Patient misidentification resulting in incorrect procedure 3 Y 1
Sedation with no oxygen 3 Y 2
Sedation with no oxygen saturation monitor 3 Y 6
Sedated patient in corridor unmonitored 3 Y 2
Recovery in corridor unattended and prolonged as waiting for porter to transfer to ward.
(No dedicated recovery and nurses in procedure room changing kit)
3 Y 1
Wrong drug administered – additional midazolam instead of pethidine 3 N 1
Wrong patient details on endoscopy report (similar surnames) 3 N 1
Wrong details on patient report (incorrect patient details) picked up on ward 3 N 1
Inadequate supervision of trainee (supervisor largely absent due to dual commitments,
present for 1 case, distracted, trainee out of depth)
3 N 4
Procedure performed by a trainee required a Consultant 3 N 2
Post-polypectomy hemorrhage requiring re-scope under GA and an overnight admission ** N 1
Total Procedures n=140.
Total PSIs n =140.
* PSI Severity rating=Mild/Moderate/Severe based upon the actual or potential impact to the patient and adherence to established guidance.
** This PSI was not categorized within this scoring system, as it was a recognized complication of the procedure with a good clinical outcome.
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Minor PSIs included a nurse assistant not suitably trained in po-
lypectomy assisting in a complex high-risk case, the endos-
copist asking for “usual diathermy settings” as unfamiliar with
equipment and the endoscopy report stating procedure per-
formed by consultant (absent) instead of the trainee.
Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use stand-
ardized methodology to prospectively evaluate within the gas-
trointestinal endoscopy suite. We found numerous instances of
patient safety incidents. These constituted individual error,
suboptimal team performance, and task-related problems. Our
findings reinforce the need to adopt a systems approach when
dissecting the causes and consequences of error. Also it should
be noted that policies and protocols to prevent many of the ob-
served PSIs were already in place but not necessarily adhered
to. For example unit protocols for administering and monitor-
ing sedation safely follow the British Society of Gastroenterolo-
gy (BSG) guidance [28], but there was variation in sedation
practices between endoscopists. Evidence-based protocols are
a necessary first step but are likely to need reinforcement via
teamwork and educational interventions.
The majority of PSIs recorded in this study were minor errors
and often there were no immediate consequences. However,
given that major errors frequently arise from a series of minor
errors (an association we also observed here) minor problems
are important to address for error prevention. These results
are in keeping with studies on medical error in other specialities
[26] whereby identifying latent failures in otherwise successful
procedures enhances risk reduction. In addition, by preventing
minor PSIs, expert teams are able to focus their time and atten-
tion on more significant issues such as technical performance,
team leadership, and managing unexpected complications.
This study shows that PSIs occur across medical, surgical,
and nursing specialities as well as during procedures performed
by experts and trainees. Targeted training therefore needs to
encompass all endoscopists to improve quality and patient
safety. Considering the frequency of PSIs across themes, oxy-
gen-monitoring errors occurred most frequently with a similar
proportion of mild, intermediate and severe PSIs within this
group. There were no acute hypoxic events related to these
PSIs, but this category had the highest number of severe PSIs,
underscoring that basic monitoring of oxygen saturations re-
mains an under-utilized safety opportunity with further meas-
ures required to ensure adherence to established guidance on
safe sedation and oxygen monitoring [29]. Sedation practices
and guidance vary internationally with conscious and deep se-
dation options for certain patients and procedures [30], and se-
dation administration and monitoring by nurses, endoscopists
or dedicated anesthetists. Anesthetic support would enhance
sedation safety, but because it is not universally available, seda-
tion selection, administration, titration, and monitoring are key
safety issues for the endoscopist to be aware of and to con-
sciously check. Similarly, the importance of monitoring the pa-
tient’s consciousness level and vital signs even in the absence of
any sedation is prudent given the increasingly aging and co-
morbid population undergoing endoscopy.
PSIs related to non-technical skills were the next most preva-
lent group, followed by distractors and time management-
related PSIs. Endoscopy non-technical skills training, although
feasible [31] and considered important [32], is not yet explicitly
formalized within existing training programs, accreditation
processes or quality assurance measures. This is increasingly re-
cognized as an important component of high-quality practice
within screening colonoscopy, for example, [33] and would be
a mechanism to address PSIs related to poor non-technical
skills and teamwork.
Considering the severe errors, 12/21 met the “never events”
criteria at the time. These included patient misidentification
and wrong procedure (colonoscopy instead of flexible sigmoi-
doscopy) both occurring in a single patient. There was no sig-
nificant harm to the patient and critics will state that the pa-
tient had the left side of the colon imaged as intended, there-
fore, it was not a “wrong procedure.” However, these errors
highlight the multiple systems failures in checking essential,
critical patient information as a significant problem. This PSI
would be perceived to be more consequential if a percutaneous
endoscopic gastrostomy (PEG) had been inserted instead of an
esophago-gastro duodenoscopy (OGD), for example, yet the
systemic latent failures whereby both these errors occur is the
same.
It is accepted in the literature that the focus for AEs should
supersede that of simply “reporting”' to “understanding” the
multifaceted reasons why an error occurred, ensuring account-
ability and addressing how future error may be prevented. In
line with international recommendations [34], identification of
error was used primarily to construct local solutions to patient
safety concerns. Our study findings were fed back to the entire
unit where the observations took place, and precipitated sever-
al actions to ensure that lessons were learned. Clearly optimiz-
ing patient management is key and more likely to occur when
the PSI is considered to be severe or to require further correc-
tive action. Additional measures included trainee debriefing by
the clinical lead for endoscopy following a difficult list, intro-
duction of an endoscopy safety checklist [35] to ensure essen-
tial baseline checks are re-confirmed by the team in the room
undertaking the procedure, and adoption of error analysis tools
such as the London Protocol [36] to educate multi-disciplinary
gastroenterology teams more widely through governance
meetings.
Limitations of this study include no long-term follow up data
on patient outcomes. Similarly, it is difficult to demonstrate
causality between PSIs and negative patient outcomes due to
a number of confounding factors. This study was a single-cen-
ter experience, which raises questions about the generalizabil-
ity of the results. Lastly, the Hawthorne effect [37] may actually
have reduced errors, as endoscopy teams may have been more
careful knowing that they were being observed.
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Conclusion
This study is the first attempt, to our knowledge, to prospec-
tively identify and analyze a broad range of patient safety inci-
dents across gastrointestinal endoscopic procedures. While
many errors were without immediate serious consequence,
they represent latent failures and thus provide a golden oppor-
tunity to intervene proactively. By documenting, understand-
ing, responding to and avoiding endoscopy error we have an
opportunity to further improve endoscopy practice and believe
this should be incorporated into existing quality assurance
mechanisms for individual endoscopists and endoscopy units.
Further work will address the question as to whether patient
safety incidents in endoscopy can be reduced by implementing
an endoscopy safety checklist. The long-term goal should focus
on accurate, relevant and transparent endoscopy patient safety
incident reporting at an individual, unit and national level.
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